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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue1
In 1998 Andre Ntagerura and Emmanuel Bagambiki were indicted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR or Tribunal) for genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide,
complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of Article 3 Common to
the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol II.2 The indictments did not include any
charges for rape.3 In February 2004, The Trial Chamber issued an acquittal of all charges4 which
was upheld by the Appeals Chamber.5 Subsequently, a domestic Rwandan court has expressed
interest in bringing charges against Ntagerura and Bagambiki for crimes against humanity for
rape.6 Ntagerura and Bagambiki are currently living in “safe houses” provided by the ICTR
because they have not been granted asylum by any third party state and cannot safely return to

1

What should the ICTR do about Ntagerura, a defendant acquitted when no amendment [to indictment?] on
rape charges was accepted [so he was never tried on rape charges], who is now wanted by Rwanda on rape charges?
Ntagerura has for a while been in a safe house in Arusha (Tanzania). Should he be turned over to Rwandan
authorities? (There are no provisions for extradition/surrender in the ICTR statute.) If so, should the Tribunal seek
assurances from Rwanda that there will be no death penalty consideration in the case?
In general, what provisions should be made for individuals accused but acquitted of war crimes? Why did the
Security Council make no provision for such individuals (as refugees? as asylum seekers?), although intricate rules
exist on enforcement of sentences upon conviction? Should the UN High Commissioner for Refugees have a role
here? Should the Security Council call upon states to offer places to those acquitted?
2

Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-96-10-1, Amended Indictment (Dec. 2, 1999) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 27] and Prosecutor v. Bagambiki & Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR-97-36),
Indictment (Nov. 5, 1998) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
3

Id.

4

Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki, & Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment (Feb 25, 2004).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].

5

ICTR, Acquittal of Ntagerura and Bagambiki upheld by Appeals Chamber (press release) ICTR/INFO-9-2468.EN, Arusha, 8 Feb. 2006 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51].
6

See Kevin Jon Heller, Rwanda Intends to Prosecute Bagambiki Following ICTR Acquittal, OPINIO JURIS, Mar. 24,
2006, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1143265194.shtml (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 50].
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Rwanda.7 This memorandum addresses what, if any, protections and provisions should be put
into place by the ICTR and the international community for those accused but acquitted of war
crimes.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Turning Ntagerura and Bagambiki over to a national court for subsequent
prosecution for crimes against humanity violates the prohibition against non bis
in idem.
The Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR Statute) holds that
“[n]o person shall be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations of
international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for which he or she has already been
tried by the International Tribunal for Rwanda.”8 This principle of non bis in idem is applied by
criminal jurisdictions internationally as either precluding subsequent prosecutions based on the
same offense as the original prosecution (in abstracto) or based on the same acts leading to the
original prosecution (in concreto).9 A jurisdiction which applies non bis in idem in a strict in
abstracto sense holds that if one of the legal offenses requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not, the principle does not bar subsequent prosecution.
However, the European Court of Human Rights has rejected such a strict approach
holding that the court must look at the offenses to determine if the essential elements are so
closely related that one offense encompasses all of the bad acts of the other.10 Additionally, if

7

George Obulutsa, UN Genocide Court Finds No Home For 4 Acquitted, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, Oct. 27, 2006,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/rwanda/2006/1027nohome.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2007)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 58].
8

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 9. http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (Feb.
5, 2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
9

Gerard Conway, Ne Bis in Idem in International Law, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 217, 227 (2003) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
10

Fischer v. Austria, 12 HRCD [2001], 342. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
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the subsequent prosecution requires that an essential aspect of an offence that has already been
tried by the court must be re-tried, the principle of non bis in idem bars the subsequent
prosecution.11 In the cases of Ntagerura and Bagambiki, a subsequent prosecution by the
Rwandan government for crimes against humanity for rape would require a showing that the
accused individuals were present at meetings and made statements which the ICTR found could
not be proven.12 Therefore, under this approach, a subsequent prosecution would be prohibited.
An examination of the text of the ICTR Statute regarding non bis in idem suggests an in
concreto application as it precludes subsequent prosecution based on “acts” for which the
accused individual has already been tried by the ICTR. Therefore, this prohibition bars any
subsequent prosecution of Ntagerura and Bagambiki by the Rwandan government for crimes
against humanity for rape arising out of the same conduct for which they were tried, and
acquitted by the ICTR.13
Finally, the underlying policy reasons for the non bis in idem principle also require that
the subsequent prosecution of Ntagerura and Bagambiki be prohibited. First, the international
community, as well as the indicted individuals, rely on respect for the finality and conclusiveness
of judgments. Second, the acquitted individuals have a right to avoid the continuing
embarrassment, stress, and stigma associated with a prosecution for crimes against humanity.

11

Sailer v. Austria, 38237/97 [2002] Eur. Ct. H.R. 486 (2002). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

12

Heller, supra note 6 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 50].

13

The specific charges which the Rwanda government plans to bring against Ntagerura and Bagambiki have not
been released. However, it appears that the only charge to be brought is that of crimes against humanity for rape,
see id. For that reason, this paper assumes that the Rwandan government is not bringing charges for rape absent the
crimes against humanity.
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Finally, allowing subsequent prosecutions for the same acts by various States will increase the
risk that Ntagerura or Bagambiki will be convicted despite being innocent.14
2. In the event that the ICTR turns any individual over to a domestic court for a
subsequent prosecution, it must seek assurances that the death penalty will not
be imposed.
The death penalty is unambiguously excluded as a possible punishment in the ICTR
Statute.15 However, Rwandan law does impose the death penalty on those convicted of the same
crimes within its national courts.16 This has created a disparity in the punishment between those
tried by the ICTR and Rwandan domestic courts as well as problems in the transfer of cases to
Rwanda’s domestic courts.17 ICTR Rules of Evidence and Procedure Rule 11 bis allows for an
indicted person to be turned over to Rwandan domestic courts to be tried.18 The rule includes
that “[i]n determining whether to refer the case in accordance with paragraph (A), the Trial
Chamber shall satisfy itself that … the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.”19 The
same requirement of assurance that the death penalty will not be imposed must be included in
any transfer from the ICTR to Rwanda of individuals for subsequent prosecution.

14

Conway, supra note 9, at 222 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34]

15

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, Punishment, in THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 546 (2006) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
16

THE PENAL CODE OF RWANDA, Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30, 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions
for Offences constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity committed since October 1, 1990,
available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 6].
17

Rwanda moves to ban death penalty, BBC NEWS, Oct. 13, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6047856.stm
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 59].

18

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 11 bis,
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/rules/101106/rop101106.pdf (Feb. 5, 2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 2].
19

Id.

12

3. While the Tribunal does not have the authority to require the UNHCR or a state
to grant refugee status to one who has been acquitted of war crimes, the
Tribunal should request the acceptance of the acquitted as a refugee.
In the context of witness protection, the Tribunal has held that it is not empowered to
order the UNHCR or any state to grant refugee status, but is restricted to requesting the
cooperation of states in this matter.20 Under international law, the definition of a refugee
include[s] not only those who can, on a case-by-case basis, be determined to have
a well-founded fear of persecution on certain grounds (so-called ‘statutory
refugees’) but also other often large groups of persons who can be determined or
presumed to be without, or unable to avail themselves of, the protection of the
government of their state of origin (now often referred to as ‘displaced
persons’).21
Given the extraordinary circumstances surrounding an accusation of war crimes, it is likely that
the accused but acquitted defendant will face persecution if forced to return to Rwanda.
However, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and the
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol), also include a provision which
excludes from refugee status “any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for
considering that: (a) [h]e has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity…[or] (b) [h]e has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of
refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee….”22 Despite being acquitted of the
mentioned crimes, it is possible that simply having been indicted for them may cause the country
to which the applicant is applying for asylum to put the applicant into this exclusion category.

20

Prosecutor v. Nsengiyumya, Case No. ICTR-96-12-1, Decision on Protective Measures for Defence Witnesses
and Their Families and Relatives (5 Nov. 1997) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].

21

GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, Definition and Description, in THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-18 (1983)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
22

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 8] and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/protocolrefugees.htm [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
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The fact that an applicant has already served his sentence, has been granted a pardon, or has
benefited from amnesty should be considered in determining whether or not to exclude.23
Following this same logic, the fact that an applicant has been accused but acquitted of war
crimes should also be considered.
Despite the obligation of the international community to grant asylum, four individuals
who have been acquitted of war crimes remain in safe houses at the ICTR because they are
unable to find a country of refuge.24 This indicates a need on the part of the ICTR to take
proactive steps to seek and encourage countries to grant these individuals asylum. The ICTR
should take these steps well in advance of any acquittal and establish agreements with accepting
countries modeled after the agreements it has already entered for the imprisonment of individuals
who are convicted.
4. Individuals who have been indicted but acquitted by the ICTR and subjected to
manifest injustice are entitled to compensation.
The ICTR Statute does not include any right of compensation for one wrongfully
prosecuted or for an individual who has been indicted and acquitted by the ICTR.25 However,
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) does recognize a right to
compensation for anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention26. The ICCPR
also states a right to compensation for anyone who has been convicted and punished where the
23

UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (1979, reedited 1992)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].

24

Acquitted Rwandan officials to live abroad for safety reasons, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Feb. 12, 2006,
http://english.people.com.cn/200602/12/eng20060212_242098.html [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
45].
25

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, Rights of the accused, in THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 537 (2006) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
26

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 1976 available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

14

conviction has subsequently been overturned or pardoned based on newly discovered facts.27 In
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, the ICTR opened the door to compensation when it held that the
accused had been detained for an illegally long period of time, and that in the event of an
acquittal, he would be entitled to compensation.28 The defendant was found guilty, however, so
the issue of how the compensation would be paid never arose.29 In 2000, the presidents of the
ICTY and ICTR sent letters to the Security Counsel suggesting that the Statute should be
amended to include the right to compensation as this now amounts to customary international
law.30 However, the Security Council has not made any amendments to the statute in this
regard.31 Due to the extraordinary circumstances surrounding detention and prosecution by the
ICTR, any individual who has been indicted and subsequently acquitted and can show that he or
she has suffered a manifest injustice should be entitled to compensation. Chapter 10 of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court outlines a procedure by which
acquitted individuals can receive compensation which could be modeled by the ICTR.

27

Id.
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Review or
Reconsideration (Mar. 31, 2000) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
28

29

Id.

30

‘Letter dated 19 September 2000 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia Addressed to the Secretary-General, annexed to Letter dated 26 September 2000 form the SecretaryGeneral Addressed to the President of the Security Council,’ UN Doc. S/2000/904 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 14] and ‘Letter dated 26 September 2000 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda Addressed to the Secretary-General, annexed to Letter dated 28 September 2000 form the SecretaryGeneral Addressed to the President of the Security Council,’ UN Doc. S/2000/925 [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 15].

31

Schabas, supra note 25, at 537 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44]
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 6, 1994, Rwandan president Habyarimina’s plane was shot out of the sky near
the Kigali Airport.32 President Habyarimina was returning from Dar-es-Salaam where he had
agreed to implement the controversial Arusha Accords, creating a power-sharing government
between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda.33 Within one hour of the assassination, Intrahamwe
militiamen set up road blocks in Kigali in search of Tutsis, members of opposition parties, and
human rights activists.34 Over the following days, “with the encouragement of radio messages
and leaders at every level of society,”35 Rwandan Hutus murdered their Tutsi neighbors.36 One
of the worst genocides the world has seen since World War II erupted.37 Over three months,
approximately 800,000 people, or 11 percent of the total population of Rwanda, were killed.38
In response, on November 8, 1994, the Secretary General of the United Nations
submitted to the Security Council the statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda.39 The Tribunal was given the mandate to prosecute those responsible for Genocide,
Crimes Against Humanity, Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of
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Additional Protocol II.40 The first trial started in January of 1997.41 As of September 2006, five
individuals have been acquitted.42
Of those five acquitted, four remain in detention in safe houses in Arusha, Tanzania
because, unfortunately, there is no other place for them to go.43 The acquitted defendants cannot
return to Rwanda, as it is likely that they will be subjected to persecution despite the acquittals.
However, no other country will grant them asylum.44 There is concern among various states that
the granting of asylum would hurt relations with the current Rwandan government in Kigali.45
However, the continued detention of those acquitted has the potential to cause several problems
for the ICTR. First, the UN does not want to be accused of “arbitrary and illegal detention.”46
Next, the ICTR is scheduled to finish its work and shut down in 2010.47 At that point, there will
no longer be a “safe house” in which to detain the acquitted. Finally, as long as the individuals
are in the custody of the ICTR, it will be forced to determine what legal protections to provide.
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One example of this final problem has already arisen. The ICTR must determine whether
or not to turn two former defendants, Andre Ntagerura and Emmanuel Bagambiki, over to the
Rwandan government to face charges in its domestic courts.48 Ntagerura and Bagambiki were
indicted by the ICTR in January of 1998 for genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide,
complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of Article 3 Common to
the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.49 Ntagerura’s indictment alleged that he
had a position of power within Cyangugu prefecture and that he used this power to promote and
aid the acts of Interahamwe militiamen, who committed massacres on civilian Tutsi
populations.50 Specifically, it alleges that he was present at various meetings in which he
encouraged the elimination of the Tutsi and that he provided vehicles for the “transport of
Interahamwe militiamen and civilians, including Tutsis, as well as for the transport of weapons
and ammunition….”51 Bagambiki’s indictment alleged that he exercised de facto and de jure
authority over army units and Interahamwe militiamen within Cyangugu prefecture.52 It further
alleged that he was also present at meetings in which he encouraged the elimination of the
Tutsi.53
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The indictments did not, however, include charges for rape. In February 2001, the
Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations filed an amicus curiae brief asking
the court to require that the prosecutor amend the indictments to include charges of rape and
sexual violence because in addition to the murder committed by the Interahamwe militiamen,
there were extensive reports of rape.54 The trial chambers ruled that this was against the ICTR
Statute as it would violate Article 15 which gives the prosecutor the sole responsibility for
investigation and prosecution.55 On February 25, 2004, Ntagerura and Bagambiki were acquitted
of all charges.56 This acquittal was upheld by the Appeals Chamber on February 8, 2006 and the
two were ordered released.57
The Rwandan government, however, has apparently agreed with the Coalition for
Women’s Rights in Conflict Situations that the indictment was flawed in excluding rape as a
crime against humanity.58 Therefore, the Rwandan government has expressed its desire to
subsequently charge Ntagerura and Bagambiki with this offense, possibly subjecting them to
double jeopardy.59
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This memo will analyze the obligations of the ICTR and the international community
towards individuals who have been indicted but acquitted of crimes against humanity, genocide,
and violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.
First, it will show that turning an individual over to a State court for subsequent prosecution
violates the prohibition against non bis in idem through an examination of various courts’
applications of the principle. Next, it will attempt to lay out the responsibilities of the
international community in providing refuge for those acquitted and what the ICTR can do to
encourage compliance.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Turning Ntagerura and Bagambiki over to the national court for subsequent
prosecution for crimes against humanity violates the prohibition against non bis in
idem.
The Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda states in Article 9 that
“[n]o person shall be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious violations of
international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for which he or she has already been
tried by the International Tribunal for Rwanda.”60 The application of this statute to the cases of
Ntagerura and Bagambiki is complicated by the fact that the accepted indictments by the ICTR
included a charge for crimes against humanity for responsibility in the “extermination of
civilians as part of a widespread and systematic attack…”61 However, the Rwandan government,
following the suggestion of the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, has
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indicated that it will bring charges for crimes against humanity for rape.62 This subsequent
prosecution in the Rwandan court would therefore be for a separate offense, crimes against
humanity for rape, arising out of the same acts, attending meetings promoting and giving
practical support for the Interahamwe militiamen’s behavior.
1. Non bis in idem in international law.
Currently, most legal scholars agree that the principle of non bis in idem does not amount
to a general principle of international law mainly because there is a large disparity in the way in
which it is applied by different legal systems.63 One of the primary issues is whether the
principle precludes further prosecution on the same facts (in concreto application) or whether
further prosecution is precluded only when it is based on the same offense (in abstracto
application).64
a. Application of non bis in idem in the United States of America.
Typically, common law legal systems follow the in abstracto application of non bis in
idem. In the United States, the principle of non bis in idem is enumerated in the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: “nor shall any person be subjected for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”65 Double jeopardy applies “where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of
an additional fact which the other does not.”66 In order for a plea of double jeopardy to stand,
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“[i]t must appear that the offense charged . . . was the same in law and in fact. The plea will be
vicious if the offenses charged in the two indictments be perfectly distinct in point of law,
however nearly they may be connected in fact.”67
Under this strict application, a subsequent prosecution will be barred only if it charges the
exact same offense with no separate elements to be proven. Therefore, because the charges by
the Rwandan government against Ntagerura and Bagambiki require a showing of rape and the
charges brought by the ICTR did not, it would appear that the subsequent prosecution by the
Rwanda court would not violate an in abstracto application of the non bis in idem principle.
b. Application of non bis in idem in the European Court of Human Rights.
Under Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, “[n]o one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal
proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been
finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State.”68
While this provision also calls for an in abstracto application, the European Court of Human
Rights has rejected the strict approach described above. In Fisher v. Austria, the Court held that
“where different offences based on one act were prosecuted consecutively, one after the final
decision of the other, the Court had to examine whether or not such offences had the same
essential elements.”69 Under this approach, the court must closely examine each offense to
determine if one offence “encompasses all the wrongs contained in the other.”70 If this is found,
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a prosecution for both offenses would violate the principle of non bis in idem.71 In addition, the
European Court of Human Rights held that “there was a breach of this Article [Protocol No. 7
article 4] if an essential aspect of an offence, which had already been tried by the courts, was
tried again by the administrative authorities.”72
Following this rule, a subsequent prosecution of Ntagerura and Bagambiki would violate
the principle of non bis in idem. A close examination of the two charged offenses shows that
there would be substantial overlap in the elements which must be proven. To prove a crime
against humanity, the prosecutor must show: “(1) that there was an attack; (2) that the attack was
widespread and systematic; (3) that the attack was directed against any civilian population; (4)
that the attack was committed on national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds; and (5)
that the accused acted with knowledge of the broader context of the attack and with knowledge
that his act(s) formed part of the attack.”73 These essential elements would overlap between the
original prosecution in the ICTR and any subsequent prosecution by the Rwandan government.
The only additional element that the Rwandan government would need to prove is that rape
occurred.
The indictment brought by the prosecutor of the ICTR alleged that Ntagerura and
Bagambiki “planned the massacres against Tutsi civilians in the Cyangugu prefecture and that
they directly participated in the training, instructing and arming of the military and para-military
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groups that committed the massacres.”74 It also alleged that subordinates of the accused
“participated in the massacres against Tutsi civilians.”75 The evidence on which the Rwandan
government would base its prosecution is not available; however, the amicus brief filed by the
Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations explains the likely theory of the
case.76 It states that “the Defendants are charged with planning, ordering, and directly
participating in the genocide that, according to testimony of Witnesses LBI and LAM, included
mass killing, rapes, enslavement and other sexual violence against Tutsi women. Moreover, the
Defendants are charged with being responsible for the actions of their subordinates in carrying
out the massacres.”77 The amicus brief states that “the evidence on record shows that these
subordinates also raped and enslaved Tutsi women in the course of their killing.”78
For the Rwandan government to prove that Ntagerura and Bagambiki are guilty of crimes
against humanity for rape it must prove that they planned, ordered, and directly participated in
the atrocities which occurred in Cyangugu prefecture. However, the ICTR held that the
prosecution was not able to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt in respect to either defendant.79
Specifically, the court held that the prosecutor had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
Ntagerura was present at meetings where he allegedly encouraged the acts or had expressed his
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support for the Intrahamwe.80 In regards to Bagambiki, the ICTR held that the prosecution had
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had actively participated in the massacres or to
prove the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the defendant and the soldiers
who carried out the massacres.81 Therefore, there would be a breach of the principle of non bis
in idem because these essential aspects of the offence, which have already been tried by the
ICTR, would be tried again by the Rwandan court.
c. Application of non bis in idem in Civil Law States and the International
Criminal Court.
Typically, states which follow the civil law tradition apply the principle of non bis in
idem in concreto.82 For example, the French Code of Criminal Procedure states “no person
legally acquitted may again be arrested or accused by reason of the same facts.”83 Additionally,
the Penal Code of the Netherlands states that “[i]f several facts, although each one in itself
constitutes a felony or a misdemeanor, are so connected that they must be considered as a single
continuous action, only one disposition of the criminal law applies.”84 Similarly, the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court provides that “no person shall be tried before the
Court with respect to conduct which formed the basis of the crimes for which the person has
been convicted or acquitted by the Court.”85 Under this application of non bis in idem, any
80
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subsequent prosecution by the Rwandan government of Ntagerura and Bagambiki which arose
from the same acts alleged in the ICTR indictment would be barred by the principle of non bis in
idem included in the ICTR statute.
d. Application of non bis in idem by the ICTR.
The ICTR has yet to apply the principle of non bis in idem in the context of subsequent
prosecutions so there is no jurisprudence through which to determine whether the court will
apply the principle in concreto or in abstracto. However, an examination of the text of Article 9
clearly indicates an in concreto application. “No person shall be tried before a national court for
acts constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law under the present Statute,
for which he or she has already been tried by the International Tribunal for Rwanda.”86 As noted
above, states which apply the principle in concreto refer to “facts,” “conduct,” or “action” in the
wording of the statutes. On the other hand, states which apply the principle in abstracto use the
term “offense.” The use of the term “act” in the ICTR statute indicates an intent that the
principle be applied in concreto.
2. The rationale for the principle of non bis in idem.
Regardless of whether the ICTR applies non bis in idem in concreto or in abstracto, the
underlying policy reasons for the principle prevent the subsequent prosecution of Ntagerura and
Bagambiki by the Rwandan government. In Crist v. Bretz87, the Supreme Court of the United
States listed several policy reasons to justify the rule against double jeopardy including:
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a. Respect for the finality and conclusiveness of judgments
The finality and conclusiveness of judgments is just as important in the context of the
ICTR and international law as it is in a national court.88 First, from the perspective of Ntagerura
and Bagambiki, “knowledge that a judgment is final removes the constant threat and anxiety of a
renewed prosecution.”89 In addition, from the perspective of the international community, the
ability to rely on the acquittal or conviction at the ICTR allows for needed certainty and
predictability.90 For example, once a defendant has been acquitted by the ICTR, a third party
state can grant asylum to the individual without concern of future extradition requests. Finality
of judgments requires that prosecutors put forth the best argument in the first trial. Prosecutors
may be more likely to have less thorough investigations or prosecutions if they know that they
could have a second chance.91 Finally, on the international level, “the finality of judgments helps
to ensure stability in international legal relations by preventing the interminable pursuit of
international criminals between jurisdictions.”92
b. Avoidance of continuing embarrassment and stress to the accused through
the application against him or her of the far greater resources and might of
the state
This rationale for the principle of non bis in idem appears to strongly apply to cases in
international law of subsequent prosecution for the same acts. First, a prosecution on the
international level involves greater stress and embarrassment than does a prosecution within
one’s home state. For example, Ntagerura and Bagambiki were detained in Arusha, Tanzania,
88
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far away from their homes, family, and friends. A subsequent prosecution in another state would
require a second relocation. In addition, the threat posed by, not one, but two states applying
their great resources to prosecuting the accused only exacerbates the threat of increased
embarrassment.93
c. Avoidance of the increased possibility that the accused will be found guilty,
though he or she is actually innocent.
Finally, as above, the ability of various individual nations to apply their vast resources
against the accused exponentially increases the likelihood that he will eventually be found guilty,
regardless of his innocence. In the cases of Ntagerura and Bagambiki, the ICTR had the
opportunity to prosecute for crimes against humanity to the best of its ability. The two were
acquitted. Allowing a domestic court to subsequently prosecute for the same acts until a
conviction is achieved violates the principle of non bis in idem.
B. In the event that the ICTR turns any individual over to a domestic court for a
subsequent prosecution, it must seek assurances that there will be no death penalty
imposed.
In addition to being subjected to the threat of double jeopardy if turned over to the
Rwandan government to face charges of crimes against humanity for rape, Ntagerura and
Bagambiki face the threat of being subjected to the death penalty. In August of 1996, the
Rwandan government adopted a new law which allowed for the prosecution of those responsible
for offenses constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed since
October 1, 1990.94 Chapter IV, Article 14 of Organic Law No. 08/96 of The Penal Code of
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Rwanda states that “[t]he penalties imposed for the offences set out in Article I shall be those
provided under the Penal Code except: (a) that persons whose acts place them in Category 1 are
liable to the death penalty.”95 Category 1 includes:
a) a person whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them
among the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime
of genocide or a crime against humanity;
b) persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, prefectoral,
communal, sector or cell level, or in a political party, or fostered such crimes;
c) notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which
they committed atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or
where they passed;
d) persons who committed acts of sexual torture.96
If the Rwandan government successfully brings charges against Ntagerura and Bagambiki for
crimes against humanity for rape, the defendants will fall under Categories 1(a)(b) or (d). The
penalty for these is death.
However, capital punishment is unambiguously excluded from the possible punishments
of the ICTR.97 This exclusion of the death penalty is the result of an international movement
away from the death penalty as reflected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and Additional Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights.98 In the
drafting of the Statue, Rwanda argued for the inclusion of the death penalty as a possible
punishment at the ICTR.99 Rwanda argued that it would be fundamentally unjust if those tried
by the international tribunal were not exposed to the death penalty while those tried in Rwandan
95
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domestic courts would be.100 This injustice would be amplified by the likelihood that those
being tried by the international tribunal are those who bear the greatest responsibility as the
masterminds and planners of the atrocities.101 Rwanda went on to point out that this “situation is
not conducive to national reconciliation in Rwanda.”102 Despite these arguments by Rwanda, the
death penalty was excluded in the ICTR because “it was simply not possible to meet those
concerns [of Rwanda] and still maintain support in the [Security] Council.”103 It is clear that the
ICTR has a clear mandate from the Security Council to avoid the death penalty.
Further, while the ICTR has no procedure for turning an acquitted defendant over to a
domestic court for subsequent prosecution, there is a provision in the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda Rules of Procedure and Evidence allowing for the transfer of defendants in
the custody of the ICTR to national courts.104 This provision was added as part of the
completion strategies to reduce the case load of the ICTR by returning cases to national courts.105
Part of the provision states that “[i]n determining whether to refer the case in accordance with
paragraph (A), the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair trial in the
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courts of the State concerned and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.”106
Following this guideline, the ICTR must seek assurances that if Ntagerura and Bagambiki are
turned over to the Rwandan government for subsequent prosecution, they will not be subjected to
the death penalty.
However, it is likely that the ICTR will be successful in getting these assurances despite
the current Rwandan law allowing for the death penalty. In October 2006, leaders of Rwandan
Political Front, the ruling party in Rwanda, endorsed a proposal to ban the death penalty.107 In
addition to the ICTR, many other countries refuse to extradite suspects to countries which
impose the death penalty.108 After a considerable amount of debate on the issue, political
leaders in Rwanda have come to the conclusion that abolishing the death penalty is in the best
interest of the country as it will facilitate the transfer of suspects from the ICTR and third party
states.109
C. The ICTR must aid individuals indicted and acquitted by it in securing the asylum
which the international community has the obligation to provide.
In December of 2006, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of the Commission on
Human Rights addressed the issue of one individual, Ignace Bagilishema, who had been kept in
detention in Arusha, Tanzania after being acquitted by the ICTR.110 Before the Working Group
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was able to publish its findings, the issue was resolved when France granted Bagilishema
asylum.111 However, the report did state that “[s]hould the Working Group ever receive another
similar case, it would remain competent, since the continued detention is attributable not to the
International Criminal Tribunal, but to the non-cooperation on the part of States. The Working
Group considers that States should cooperate in either case.”112 It is clear that the Commission
on Human Rights believes that third party States have the responsibility to grant asylum to
individuals acquitted by the ICTR.
The ICTR has not directly addressed the issue of refugee status for individuals acquitted.
However, there have been requests by defendants that the ICTR require the United Nations High
Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) and host countries to grant asylum to Tribunal
witnesses113 under Article 28 of the ICTR Statute.114 The ICTR has repeatedly recognized that
it does not have the authority to require the UNHCR or any State to grant refugee status to a
witness and that it is limited to requesting cooperation of States under the Statute.115
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1. The right to asylum under international law.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that “[e]veryone has the right to
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”116 Following World War II, the
international community codified this principle in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees (1951 Convention).117 Later, the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees
(1967 Protocol) was adopted to remove the temporal and geographical limitations included in the
previous document.118 In it, a refugee is defined as one whom
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.119
The practice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) adds to the
definition of a refugee to also include displaced persons, “large groups of persons who can be
determined or presumed to be without, or unable to avail themselves of, the protection of the
government of their state of origin.”120
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The 1951 Convention also includes the right of an asylum seeker to non-refoulement.
Article 33 states that “[n]o contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.”121 Some refugee scholars assert that this provision is binding on all states.122
Finally, the right of asylum specifically for an individual acquitted by the ICTR can be
inferred from Article 1(D) of the 1951 Convention. First, Article 1(D) limits the application of
the Convention to exclude individuals who are currently receiving protection or assistance from
any organ or agency of the United Nations.123 For present purposes, it can be said that
individuals who are being detained by the ICTR in safe houses in Arusha, Tanzania are being
given protection or assistance from an organ of the United Nations. Article 1(D) goes on to state
that “[w]hen such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such
persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits
of this Convention.”124 Once an individual has been acquitted by the ICTR, he or she is to be
released.125 Upon release, if the individual is unable to return to his former home, the protection
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or assistance of an organ of the United Nations has ceased without the position of such person
being settled by a resolution of the General Assembly. Currently, the individuals who have been
acquitted by the ICTR have not been released and are still living in safe houses protected by the
ICTR. At the very latest, upon the conclusion of the ICTR, the safe houses will cease to exist
and the individuals will no longer have the assistance and protection of the United Nations. At
this time, they will, ipso facto, be entitled to refugee status.
2. The application of the Exclusion Clause to individuals indicted, but acquitted by
the ICTR.
However, the 1951 Convention also includes a provision under which a person can be
excluded from refugee status if “there are serious reasons for considering that … he has
committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the
international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crime.”126 The
Exclusion Clause was put into place as a means for States to protect themselves from unwanted
criminal refugees as well as to bar international protection for those deemed to be undeserving of
it.127 The Exclusion Clause has the potential to be used by third party States to bar the granting
of asylum to individuals indicted by the ICTR, regardless of a subsequent acquittal.
The application of the Exclusion Clause, like the determination to grant or deny refugee
status, is left to the Contracting State where asylum is being requested.128 The UNHCR has
provided interpretive guidelines concerning policy formulations and procedural standards for the
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implementation of the Exclusion Clause by individual States.129 This Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees (Handbook) states that for the Exclusion Clause to apply, “it is
sufficient to establish that there are ‘serious reasons for considering’ that one of the acts
described has been committed. Formal proof of previous penal prosecution is not required.”130
This indicates that a conviction is not necessary to preclude an individual from refugee status,
and, therefore, defendants who have been indicted and subsequently acquitted can still be barred
as long as “serious reasons for considering” that the act has been committed remain.
The Handbook goes on to caution that “[c]onsidering the serious consequences of
exclusion for the person concerned, however, the interpretation of these exclusion clauses must
be restrictive.”131 The Handbook makes no reference to individuals who have been acquitted of
crimes against humanity. However, in reference to another ground for exclusion under Article
1(F), commission of a serious non-political crime,132 the Handbook includes as facts to be
considered in the determination of refugee status that a convicted applicant “has already served
his sentence or has been granted a pardon or has benefited from an amnesty.”133 The Handbook
explains that that “there is a presumption that the exclusion clause is no longer applicable, unless
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it can be shown that, despite the pardon or amnesty, the applicant’s criminal character
predominates.”134 By analogy, The Exclusion Clause should be presumed to no longer apply if
an individual has been acquitted of crimes against humanity by the ICTR. As an ICTR officer
has noted, “[y]ou can’t get more innocent than seven or eight judges telling the world that they
are innocent.”135
3. Responsibilities of the ICTR regarding asylum for acquitted individuals.
Despite the fact that the Exclusion Clause should not be used by third party States to
exclude individuals acquitted of charges for crimes against humanity, and despite the general
obligation to provide asylum for deserving individuals, no state has been willing to grant asylum
to the former defendants of the ICTR remaining in safe houses in Arusha, Tanzania. For this
reason, it is necessary that the ICTR take an active role in encouraging the international
community to live up to its obligations and provide asylum for the acquitted individuals.
The case of Ignace Bagilishema represents the one instance in which an individual was
acquitted by the ICTR and subsequently found asylum in a third party State.136 However, even
in this case, Bagilishema was not granted refugee status by France until ICTR Registrar, Adama
Dieng made a special appeal to the French government.137 Upon agreeing to grant asylum, the
spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry stated that it was doing so “in the spirit of
cooperation which France has always had towards the Tribunal, also in the superior interests of
134
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international criminal justice and its fundamental principles, which includes the presumption of
innocence."138
While the ICTR Registrar took the active steps necessary to encourage France to grant
asylum to Bagilishema, there are no provisions in the ICTR Statute or Rules of Procedure and
Evidence which require this. In contrast, Article 26 of the ICTR Statute provides for measures to
be taken by the ICTR for the imprisonment of individuals who are convicted.139 In line with this
provision, the ICTR has entered various agreements with third party States which go into great
detail on the imprisonment of the individuals convicted by the ICTR.140 The ICTR needs to take
a similar proactive step to seek out and encourage countries to grant asylum to individuals
acquitted by the ICTR and enter equivalent agreements.
D. Individuals who have been indicted but acquitted by the ICTR and subjected to
manifest injustice are entitled to compensation.
Currently, there is no provision included in the ICTR Statute or Rules of Procedure and
Evidence to allow for compensation for individuals who have been indicted but acquitted by the
ICTR. However, in September 2000, Judge Navanethem Pillay, President of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, sent a letter to the Secretary General requesting that the Security
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Council amend the statute to include such a provision.141 As of 2006, the Security Council has
not acted on this request.142
1. Compensation for those unlawfully convicted, arrested, or detained under
international law.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights143 as well as the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms144 recognize a right
to compensation for anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention. The ICCPR
also states a right to compensation for anyone who has been convicted and punished where the
conviction has subsequently been overturned or pardoned based on newly discovered facts.145 In
her letter to the Secretary General, Judge Pillay observed that these documents establish that “the
United Nations is required, under generally accepted human rights norms, to compensate the
individual who has been unlawfully convicted, arrested or detained.”146 However, simply
because one has been arrested and tried and later acquitted does not make the arrest and
141
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prosecution unlawful as long as it was based on “a reasonable suspicion of having committed a
crime.”147
2. Compensation for those detained and subsequently acquitted under
international law.
In addition to granting a right for compensation to those who have been wrongly detained
and prosecuted, some countries, such as Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, grant
compensation to those who have been detained pending a trial at which they were acquitted, or
against whom charges were withdrawn.148 The International Criminal Court provides that “[i]n
exceptional circumstances, where the Court finds conclusive facts showing that there has been a
grave and manifest miscarriage of justice, it may in its discretion award compensation…to a
person who has been released from detention following a final decision of acquittal or a
termination of the proceedings for that reason.”149
3. Compensation for violation of the rights of accused under the ICTR.
Despite the fact that the ICTR statute includes no provision for compensation for anyone,
whether they have been illegally detained or prosecuted, or simply have been acquitted of all
charges, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has indicated that in some instances compensation is
necessary. In Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, the tribunal reached the conclusion that “the
Appellant’s rights were violated, and that all violations demand a remedy” where Barayagwiza
147
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had been detained illegally and for an extended time.150 The court ordered that in the event of an
acquittal, he would be entitled to compensation.151 The Appeals Chamber gave no indication of
how this compensation would be paid. However, Barayagwiza was convicted of inciting
genocide. As a result of this conviction, his compensation was in the form of a reduced sentence
from life imprisonment to thirty-five years.152
4. Need for compensation for individuals indicted and subsequently acquitted by
the ICTR.
In addition to the need for a means to compensate those who have had rights violated by
the ICTR, such as Barayagwiza, the special circumstances under which the ICTR conducts
prosecutions requires that individuals who have been indicted but acquitted by the ICTR be
compensated. First, accused persons at the ICTR are held in pre-trial detention for extended
periods of time.153 In addition, an indictment by the ICTR results in a suspect being labeled in
the international community as a “war criminal” which cannot be easily removed with an
acquittal.154 “Over and above the effect on their career prospects and earning potential, accused
persons, unless they are entitled to legal aid, must also bear the substantial financial burden of
defending themselves before an international tribunal situated at a considerable distance from

150

Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Review or
Reconsideration (Mar. 31, 2000) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
151

Schabas, supra note 25, at 538 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44].

152

Id.

153

‘‘Letter dated 26 September 2000 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Addressed to the Secretary-General, annexed to Letter dated 28 September 2000 form the Secretary-General
Addressed to the President of the Security Council,’ UN Doc. S/2000/925 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 15].

154

Beresford, supra note 148, at 630 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].

41

their families and friends.”155 In short, given the nature of the proceedings, a prosecution by the
ICTR subjects the accused to such extraordinary hardships and extended periods of detention
that compensation is justified for those who are acquitted.
5. The ICC as a model for compensation at the ICTR.
In its entirety, Article 85 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court states
that
[i]n exceptional circumstances, where the Court finds conclusive facts showing
that there has been a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice, it may in its
discretion award compensation, according to the criteria provided in the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, to a person who has been released from detention
following a final decision of acquittal or a termination of the proceeding for that
reason.156
Chapter 10 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC detail the process by which
compensation is awarded to an arrested or convicted person.157 A process for the compensation
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of individuals acquitted and those illegally arrested or prosecuted by the ICTR can be modeled
on the process outlined by the ICC. First, an individual seeking compensation must submit a
written request to the Tribunal within six months of being notified of the unlawfulness of the
arrest, the reversal of conviction or the acquittal, or the grave injustice suffered. The request
should include the grounds and the amount of compensation requested. Upon receipt of this
request, the Tribunal will designate a chamber that was not involved in the original judgment to
evaluate the request. The prosecutor will be given the opportunity to comment on the request.
The designated chamber can make its determination of compensation based on the written
request, comments by the prosecutor, and a hearing if one has been ordered or requested.
Finally, in determining what, if any, compensation is to be awarded, the judges should consider
the consequences of the injustices on the personal, family, social and professional situation of the
person filing the request. It must also be noted that if an amendment to the ICTR Statute is
adopted, the General Assembly will also have to subsequently approve the necessary
appropriation to the Tribunal’s budget.158
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IV. CONCLUSION
The ICTR Statute precludes a subsequent prosecution against an individual for acts for
which he or she has already been tried by the ICTR. Accordingly, a trial of an individual
acquitted at the ICTR by the Rwandan government for crimes against humanity for rape would
violate the principle of non bis in idem if it is found that the defendant has already been tried by
the ICTR for crimes against humanity for the same conduct. While most criminal jurisdictions
recognize this principle, there is no generally accepted way in which to apply it. Most countries
following a common law tradition, as well at the European Court of Human Rights, apply the
principle in an in abstracto sense. That is, an individual cannot be tried for the same criminal
offense more than once. An in abstracto application of the principle to the cases of Ntagerura
and Bagambiki would prevent a subsequent prosecution by the Rwandan government as this
prosecution would require a showing of facts that the ICTR has determined cannot be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast to this application, many countries which follow the civil
law tradition apply the principle non bis in idem in concreto. Under this application, an
individual cannot be subsequently tried on charges which arise out of the same conduct for
which he or she has already been tried. This application would also preclude the Rwandan
government from being able to prosecute Ntagerura or Bagambiki, as the charges arise from the
same conduct as did the indictment at the ICTR. Based on the text of the rule, an in concreto
application of the non bis in idem provision of the ICTR Statute is appropriate.
However, if in spite of the above analysis the ICTR does turn Ntagerura or Bagambiki
over to the Rwandan government for prosecution, the Tribunal must seek assurances that the
death penalty will not be imposed. Rule 11 bis of the ICTR Rules of Evidence and Procedure
requires that the Tribunal seek these assurances before it transfers indicted individuals from the
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ICTR to a domestic court for prosecution. Likewise, the Tribunal must seek these same
assurances any time it turns over suspects. However, there are indications that Rwanda will
abolish the death penalty, which will satisfy this requirement.
Under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, the
international community has an obligation to provide asylum for individuals, such as those
acquitted by the ICTR, who have a well founded fear which prevents them from returning to
their home country. The Exclusion Clause included in the 1951 Convention bars asylum for an
individual about whom there are serious reasons for considering that he or she has committed a
crime against humanity. However, the Exclusion Clause should not apply in the case of
individuals who have been acquitted of crimes against humanity by the ICTR, as this acquittal
removes all legal reasons for considering they have committed the acts. In order to ensure that
these individuals are granted the international protection to which they are entitled, the ICTR
needs to take proactive steps to reach agreements with third party States to provide asylum.
Finally, international law requires compensation for individuals who have been
unlawfully detained or prosecuted. However, neither the ICTR Statute nor the Rules of Evidence
and Procedure make any provisions for compensation for individuals who are subjected to this
by the ICTR. In addition to an amendment to allow for such compensation, the U.N. Security
Council needs to allow for compensation for individuals who have been detained, prosecuted and
subsequently acquitted by the ICTR where a manifest injustice has occurred. While international
law does not require compensation in these situations, given the extraordinary circumstances
surrounding a prosecution by the ICTR, including the length of detention, compensation is
appropriate. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court provide a
good model on which to base this procedure.
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